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The Hamiltonian Syllogistic
Ian Pratt-Hartmann
Abstract
This paper undertakes a re-examination of Sir William Hamilton’s doc-
trine of the quantification of the predicate. Hamilton’s doctrine comprises
two theses. First, the predicates of traditional syllogistic sentence-forms
contain implicit existential quantifiers, so that, for example, All p are q
is to be understood as All p are some q. Second, these implicit quan-
tifiers can be meaningfully dualized to yield novel sentence-forms, such
as, for example, All p are all q. Hamilton attempted to provide a deduc-
tive system for his language, along the lines of the classical syllogisms.
We show, using techniques unavailable to Hamilton, that such a system
does exist, though with qualifications that distinguish it from its classical
counterpart.
1 Introduction
By the classical syllogistic, we understand the set of English sentences of the
forms
Every p is a q Some p is a q
No p is a q Some p is not a q,
(1)
where p and q are common (count) nouns. These sentence-forms are evidently
logically equivalent to the following more cumbersome forms:
Every p is identical to some q Some p is identical to some q
No p is identical to any q Some p is not identical to any q.
(2)
By the Hamiltonian syllogistic, we understand the set of sentences of the forms (2),
together with the set of sentences of the forms
Every p is identical to every q Some p is identical to every q
No p is identical to every q Some p is not identical to every q,
(3)
obtained from (2) by dualizing the second quantifier. Taking account of the
equivalence of the forms (1) and (2), we informally regard the classical syllogistic
as a subset of the Hamiltonian syllogistic. The sentence-forms (3) have no
idiomatic English equivalents. We take their respective first-order translations
to be
∀x(p(x) → ∀y(q(y)→ x = y)) ∃x(p(x) ∧ ∀y(q(y)→ x = y))
∀x(p(x) → ¬∀y(q(y)→ x = y)) ∃x(p(x) ∧ ¬∀y(q(y)→ x = y)).
(4)
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Thus, for example, Every p is identical to every q is true just in case there are no
p s, or no qs, or there is exactly one p and one q, and they are identical. Observe
that determiners in subjects are taken to outscope those in predicates. Observe
also that verb negation is taken to outscope the following predicate determiner.
Thus, for example, Some p is not identical to every q is true just in case some
p is distinct from some q.
By a classical syllogism we understand any of the valid two-premise argument
patterns for sentences of the forms (1), for example:
Every p is a q
Every q is an r
Every p is an r
Every q is an r
Some p is a q
Some p is an r.
It is known that the classical syllogisms—with one or two minor additions—
constitute a sound and complete proof system for the classical syllogistic. Does
there exist a comparable system of rules for the Hamiltonian syllogistic?
The Hamiltonian syllogistic is so called because of its more-than-passing re-
semblance to Sir William Hamilton’s doctrine of the quantification of the pred-
icate. (That is: Sir William Hamilton, Bart., the Scottish philosopher, not Sir
William Hamilton, Kt., the Irish mathematician who discovered quaternions.)
According to that doctrine, the predicates of the traditional syllogistic forms
All p are q Some p are q
No p are q Some p are not q,
contain a suppressed existential quantifier (present, as Hamilton put it, in
thought), which can meaningfully be dualized to yield the forms
All p are all q Some p are all q
No p are all q Some p are not all q.
These latter sentences are of course, grammatically marginal, and we are owed
an account of their purported meaning. Unfortunately, Hamilton’s presentation
is hopelessly obscure in this regard: the closest we get to a formal account are
the collections of diagrams in [3], pp. 682–683 and [4], p. 277. However, it is
certain, from the accompanying text, that Hamilton took All p are all q to
assert that p and q are coextensive—different from the meaning of the formula
∀x(p(x)→ ∀y(q(y)→ x = y)), and logically uninteresting.
Hamilton originally expounded his theory in an 1846 edition of the works of
Sir Thomas Reid, in the form of a Prospectus of “An Essay towards a New An-
alytic of Logical Forms”, reproduced, with some variations, in the two sources
mentioned above. The essay itself was never written. Nevertheless, Hamilton’s
theory generated a heated debate with Augustus De Morgan, and was the sub-
ject of a critical commentary by John Stuart Mill ([7], Ch. XXII). The present
paper attempts neither to resurrect that debate, nor to adjudicate its outcome.
Unlike Hamilton’s quantified predicates, the sentence-forms in (2) and (3) are
clearly grammatical, and the question of the existence of sound and complete
proof procedures for this language consequently well-formed. Of course, to be
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well-formed is one thing; to be well-motivated, another. We mention just one
striking historical fact by way of justification. Notwithstanding their dubious
grammatical status, copula sentences with quantified predicates make regular
appearances in discussions of the syllogism, beginning with Aristotle himself
(see [1], A27, 43a12–43b22). Indeed, Hamilton’s own extensive survey of this
literature can be found in [4], pp. 298-317. Why, if we happily judge No pacifist
admires every quaker to be grammatical, are we much less comfortable with No
pacifist is every quaker? What, if anything, is this non-grammaticality judge-
ment preventing us from expressing? And if there is something, what would be
the logical consequences of expressing it anyway? Thus, our investigation of the
Hamiltonian syllogistic addresses a venerable, if currently quiescent, issue.
On the basis of the equivalence of the forms (1) and (2), we take the best
candidates for syllogistic forms with universally quantified predicates to be (3),
interpreted as (4). We show in the sequel that, under this interpretation, no
finite set of syllogistic rules can be sound and complete for the Hamiltonian
syllogistic, a fact which distinguishes it from its classical subset. However, we
do provide a finite set of such rules which is sound and refutation-complete—
i.e. becomes complete if the rule of reductio ad absurdum is permitted as a final
step. We go on to consider the effect of adding noun-level negation to the Hamil-
tonian syllogistic, yielding such sentence-forms as No non-p is identical to every
non-q. We show that, unless PTime=NPTime, no finite set of syllogistic rules
can be sound and refutation-complete for this extended language. However,
we do provide a finite set of such rules which are sound and complete if the
rule of reductio ad absurdum may be used without restriction. Such sensitivity
to noun-level negation again distinguishes the Hamiltonian syllogistic from its
classical subset.
By replacing the words is identical to in (2) and (3) by a suitably inflected
transitive verb v (admire, despise . . . ), we obtain the forms
Every p vs some q Some p vs some q
No p vs any q Some p does not v any q
Every p vs every q Some p vs every q
No p vs every q Some p does not v every q.
This language was analysed in Pratt-Hartmann and Moss [8], where it was called
the relational syllogistic. It was shown there that no finite set of syllogistic rules
in the relational syllogistic is sound and complete, though there is a finite set
of rules that is sound and refutation-complete. It was shown in the same paper
that, when the relational syllogistic is extended with noun-level negation, there
is no finite set of syllogistic rules that is sound and complete for the resulting
language, even when the rule of reductio ad absurdum may be used without
restriction. Thus, the Hamiltonian syllogistic differs in its proof-theoretic prop-
erties from the relational syllogistic as well.
2 Syntax and semantics
In this section, we define five formal languages: (i) S, a formalization of the
classical syllogistic, (ii) S†, its extension with noun-level negation, (iii) H, a for-
malization of the Hamiltonian syllogistic, (iv) H†, its extension with noun-level
negation, and (v) H∗†, an extension of H† motivated chiefly by the formalism
used below.
Fix a countably infinite set P. We refer to any element of P as an atom.
A literal is an expression of either of the forms p or p¯, where p is an atom. A
literal which is an atom is called positive, otherwise, negative. If ℓ = p¯ is a
negative literal, then we denote by ℓ¯ the positive literal p. A structure is a pair
A = 〈A, {pA}p∈P〉, where A is a non-empty set, and p
A ⊆ A, for every p ∈ P.
The set A is called the domain of A. We extend the map p 7→ pA to negative
literals by setting, for any atom p,
p¯A = A \ pA.
Intuitively, we may think of the elements of P as common count-nouns, such as
pacifist, quaker, republican, etc., and we think of pA as the set of things falling
under the noun p according to the structure A. Thus, we may read p¯ as either
non-p or not a p, depending on grammatical context.
An S-formula is any expression of the forms
∀(p, q) ∀(p, q¯) ∀(p¯, q¯)
∃(p, q) ∃(p, q¯) ∃(p¯, q),
(5)
where p and q are atoms; and an S†-formula is any expression of the forms
∀(ℓ,m) ∃(ℓ,m), (6)
where ℓ and m are literals. Thus, every S-formula is an S†-formula. If A is a
structure, we write A |= ∀(ℓ,m) if ℓA ⊆ mA, and A |= ∃(ℓ,m) if ℓA∩mA 6= ∅. We
think of A |= ϕ as asserting that ϕ is true in the structure A. Thus, we may read
∀(ℓ,m) as Every ℓ is anm and ∃(ℓ,m) as Some ℓ is anm. Under these semantics,
the formulas ∃(ℓ,m) and ∃(m, ℓ) are true in exactly the same structures; and
similarly for the formulas ∀(ℓ,m) and ∀(m¯, ℓ¯). In the sequel, we identify these
pairs of formulas, silently converting one into the other where needed. Taking
account of these identifications, S contains four different formulas (not six),
which may be glossed by the sentence-forms (1) or, equivalently, (2). Likewise,
S† contains six different formulas (not eight), where ∀(p¯, q) is to be glossed as
Every non-p is a q, and ∃(p¯, q¯) as Some non-p is not a q.
Turning now to the languages H, H† and H∗†, a c-term is either a literal
or any expression of the forms ∀p or ∀p, where p is an atom; and an e-term is
either a literal or any expression of the forms ∀ℓ or ∀ℓ, where ℓ is a literal. Thus,
all literals are c-terms, and all c-terms are e-terms. If e is an e-term of the form
∀ℓ, we take e¯ to be the corresponding e-term ∀ℓ. It follows that e¯ is a c-term if
and only if e is, and e¯ is a literal if and only if e is; moreover, for any e-term e,
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e¯ = e. If A is a structure, we extend the map ℓ 7→ ℓA to non-literal e-terms by
setting, for any literal ℓ,
(∀ℓ)A = {a ∈ A | a = b for all b ∈ ℓA}
(∀ℓ)A = {a ∈ A | a 6= b for some b ∈ ℓA},
Thus, we may read ∀ℓ as thing that is identical to every ℓ, and ∀ℓ as thing that
is not identical to every ℓ (that is: thing that is distinct from some ℓ). Because
terms of the form ∀ℓ can be confusing to parse in certain contexts, we sometimes
enclose them in parentheses, thus: (∀ℓ).
An H-formula is any expression of the forms
∀(p, c) ∀(c, p¯)
∃(p, c) ∃(c, p),
where p is an atom and c is a c-term; an H†-formula is any expression of the
forms
∀(ℓ, e) ∃(ℓ, e),
where ℓ is a literal and e is an e-term; and an H∗†-formula is any expression of
the forms
∀(e, f) ∃(e, f),
where e and f are e-terms. Thus, every S†-formula is an H formula, every
H-formula is an H† formula, and every H†-formula is an H∗† formula. We de-
fine A |= ϕ for H∗†-formulas in the same way as for S†-formulas, again silently
converting ∃(e, f) to ∃(f, e), and ∀(e, f) to ∀(f¯ , e¯), as needed. Taking account
of these conversions, the eight forms of H-formula may be glossed using the
sentence-forms (2) and (3); and H†-formulas may be similarly glossed, but us-
ing negated noun-phrases such as non-pacifist, non-quaker, etc. in the obvious
way. Formulas of the language H∗†, by contrast, require more elaborate English
translations: for example, ∀(∀p¯, ∀q) may be glossed as:
Everything that is identical to every non-p is distinct from some q.
The primary motivation for considering the system H∗† is the greater simplicity
of its associated deduction system.
We denote the set of all S-formulas by S, and similarly for the other lan-
guages considered here. Where the language is clear from context, we speak sim-
ply of formulas. If ϕ = ∀(e, f), we write ϕ¯ to denote ∃(e, f¯); and if ϕ = ∃(e, f),
we write ϕ¯ to denote ∀(e, f¯). Thus, ϕ¯ = ϕ, and, in any structure A, A |= ϕ if
and only if A 6|= ϕ¯. It is simple to check that, if L is any of the languages S, S†,
H or H†, then ϕ ∈ L implies ϕ¯ ∈ L: that is, all the languages introduced above
are, in effect, closed under negation. If Θ is a set of formulas, we write A |= Θ
if, for all θ ∈ Θ, A |= θ. A formula θ is satisfiable if there exists a structure A
such that A |= θ; a set of formulas Θ is satisfiable if there exists A such that
A |= Θ. If, for all structures A, A |= Θ implies A |= θ, we say that Θ entails θ,
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and write Θ |= θ. We call a formula of the form ∃(e, e¯) an absurdity, and use ⊥
to denote, indifferently, any absurdity. Evidently, ⊥ is unsatisfiable.
We illustrate the logics H and H† with some sample entailments. In the
former case, we have, for example:
{∃(p, ∀q), ∃(q, o)} |= ∀(q, o). (7)
For suppose that some p is identical to every q, and there is a q which is also
an o. Then there is exactly one q, and it is o; therefore, every q is an o. In the
latter case, we have, for example:
{∀(p, ∀p), ∀(p¯, p), ∃(q1, q1)} |= ∀(q2, q1) (8)
{∀(p, ∀p), ∀(p¯, ∀p¯), ∃(q1, q¯2), ∃(q2, q¯3)} |= ∀(q3, q1). (9)
The validity (8) follows from the fact that any model of the premises has a
1-element domain. Likewise, in (9), any model of the premises has a 2-element
domain. Thus, in the language H†, it is possible to write satisfiable sets of
formulas whose only models are of size 1 or 2. (This is trivially impossible in
H.) On the other hand, we shall see in Theorem 7.11 that, if a set of H∗†-
formulas has a model with three or more elements, then it has arbitrarily large
models.
To ease readability in proofs, we employ the following variable-naming con-
ventions. The variables o, p and q (possibly with decorations) are to be under-
stood as ranging only over atoms, the variables ℓ and m only over literals, the
variables c and d only over c-terms, and the variables e, f and g over e-terms.
Thus, for example, if S is a set of e-terms, the statement “there exists ℓ ∈ S
. . . ” should be read as “there exists a literal ℓ ∈ S . . . ”, and so on.
3 Proof Theory
By a syllogistic language, we mean any of the languages S, S†, H, H† or H∗†.
This enumerative definition could be replaced by a more general characteriza-
tion; however, the details are not relevant to the concerns of this paper, and
we avoid them. The problem of finding sound and complete rule-systems for
the language S was solved (independently) in Smiley [9], Corcoran [2] and Mar-
tin [5]. This result is strengthened marginally in Pratt-Hartmann and Moss [8]
(as explained below), and extended to the language S†. Here, we seek a system
of syllogistic rules which generate exactly the entailments in the languages H,
H† and H∗†. Because our results will be partly negative in character, we adopt
a relatively formal approach.
Let L be a syllogistic language. A syllogistic rule in L is a pair Θ/θ, where
Θ is a finite set (possibly empty) of L-formulas, and θ an L-formula. We call Θ
the antecedents of the rule, and θ its consequent. We generally display rules in
‘natural-deduction’ style. For example,
∃(p, q) ∀(q, o)
∃(p, o)
∃(p, q) ∀(q, o¯)
∃(p, o¯)
, (10)
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where p, q and o are atoms, are syllogistic rules in S, (hence in any larger
syllogistic language) corresponding to the traditional syllogisms Darii and Ferio,
respectively. A rule is valid if its antecedents entail its consequent. Thus, the
rules (10) are valid. As a further example, the following obvious generalizations
of (10) are valid syllogistic rules in H:
∃(p, q) ∀(q, ∀o)
∃(p, ∀o)
∃(p, q) ∀(q, ∀o)
∃(p, ∀o)
. (11)
Let L be a syllogistic language and X a set of syllogistic rules in L; and
denote by P(L) the set of subsets of L. A substitution is a function g : P → P;
we extend g to L-formulas and to sets of L-formulas in the obvious way. An
instance of a syllogistic rule Θ/θ is the syllogistic rule g(Θ)/g(θ), where g is a
substitution. We define the direct syllogistic derivation relation ⊢X to be the
smallest relation on P(L)× L satisfying:
1. if θ ∈ Θ, then Θ ⊢X θ;
2. if {θ1, . . . , θn}/θ is a syllogistic rule in X, g a substitution, Θ = Θ1 ∪ · · · ∪
Θn, and Θi ⊢X g(θi) for all i (1 6 i 6 n), then Θ ⊢X g(θ).
Where the language L is clear from context, we omit reference to it; further,
we typically contract syllogistic rule to rule. Instances of the relation ⊢X can
always be established by derivations in the form of finite trees in the usual way.
For instance, the derivation
∃(p, q) ∀(q, o)
∃(p, o)
(D1)
∀(o, r¯)
∃(p, r¯)
(D1)
establishes that, for any set of syllogistic rules X containing the rules (10),
{∃(p, q), ∀(q, o), ∀(o, r¯)} ⊢X ∃(p, r¯).
In the sequel, we reason freely about derivations in order to establish properties
of derivation relations. The tags (D1) merely serve to indicate the rule employed
in each step of the derivation: both the rules in (10) fall under a group which
we shall later call (D1).
The syllogistic derivation relation ⊢X is said to be sound if Θ ⊢X θ implies
Θ |= θ, and complete (for L) if Θ |= θ implies Θ ⊢X θ. A set Θ of formulas is
inconsistent (with respect to ⊢X) if Θ ⊢X ⊥ for some absurdity ⊥; otherwise, con-
sistent. It is obvious that, for any set of rules X, ⊢X is sound if and only if every
rule in X is valid. A weakening of completeness called refutation-completeness
will prove important in the sequel: ⊢X is refutation-complete if any unsatisfi-
able set Θ is inconsistent with respect to ⊢X. Completeness trivially implies
refutation-completeness, but not conversely.
The languages H† and H∗† turn out to require a stronger form of proof-
system than that provided by direct derivation relations. Let L be a syllogistic
language and X a set of syllogistic rules in L. We define the indirect syllogistic
derivation relation X to be the smallest relation on P(L)× L satisfying:
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1. if θ ∈ Θ, then Θ X θ;
2. if {θ1, . . . , θn}/θ is a syllogistic rule in X, g a substitution, Θ = Θ1 ∪ · · · ∪
Θn, and Θi X g(θi) for all i (1 6 i 6 n), then Θ X g(θ).
3. if Θ ∪ {θ} X ⊥, where ⊥ is any absurdity, then Θ X θ¯.
The only difference is the addition of the final clause, which allows us to derive
a formula θ¯ from premises Θ if we can derive an absurdity from Θ together with
θ. Instances of the indirect derivation relation X may also be established by
constructing derivations, except that we need a little more machinery to keep
track of premises. This may be done as follows. Suppose we have a derivation
(direct or indirect) showing that Θ ∪ {θ} X ⊥, for some absurdity ⊥. Let this
derivation be displayed as
θ1 · · · θn θ · · · θ....
⊥,
where θ1, . . . , θn is a list of formulas of Θ (not necessarily exhaustive, and with
repeats allowed). Applying Clause 3 of the definition of X, we have Θ X θ¯,
which we take to be established by the derivation
θ1 · · · θn [θ]1 · · · [θ]1....
⊥
θ¯
(RAA)1.
The tag (RAA) stands for reductio ad absurdum; the square brackets indicate
that the enclosed instances of θ have been discharged, i.e. no longer count among
the premises; and the numerical indexing is simply to make the derivation his-
tory clear. Note that there is nothing to prevent θ from occurring among the
θ1, . . . , θn; that is to say, we do not have to discharge all (or indeed any) in-
stances of the premise θ if we do not want to. Again, it should be obvious that,
for any set of rules X, X is sound if and only if every rule in X is valid, and
X is complete if it is refutation complete. It is important to understand that
reductio ad absurdum cannot be formulated as a syllogistic rule in the techni-
cal sense defined here; rather, it is part of the proof-theoretic machinery that
converts any set of rules X into the derivation relation X.
Syllogistic rules that differ only by renaming of atoms have the same sets of
instances, and so may be regarded as identical. That is, in rules such as (10)
and (11), we may informally think of the atoms o, p and q as metavariables
ranging over the set of atoms P. This suggests the following notational conven-
tion. Taking the meta-variable c to range over c-terms, we may comprehend the
four rules in (10) and (11) under the single schema
∃(p, q) ∀(q, c)
∃(p, c)
(D1).
8
We shall employ this schematic notation in the sequel. Note, however, that such
schemata are always shorthand for a finite number of rules. In the sequel, we
generally refer to rule schemata simply as rules.
The following complexity-theoretic observations on derivation relations will
prove useful in this paper.
Lemma 3.1. Let L be a syllogistic language, θ ∈ L and Θ ⊆ L. If there is a
derivation (direct or indirect) of θ from Θ using some set of rules X, then there
is such a derivation involving only the atoms occurring in Θ ∪ {θ}.
Proof. Given a derivation of θ from Θ, uniformly replace any unary atom that
does not occur in Θ ∪ {θ} with one that does.
Proposition 3.2. Let L be a syllogistic language, and X a finite set of syllogistic
rules in L. The problem of determining whether Θ ⊢X θ, for a given set of L-
formulas Θ and L-formula θ, is in PTime. Hence, if ⊢X is sound and refutation-
complete, the satisfiability problem for L is in PTime.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, we may confine attention to derivations featuring only the
atoms in Θ∪{θ}. The numberm of L-formulas featuring these atoms is bounded
by a quadratic function of |Θ∪{θ}|; evidently, we need only consider derivations
with m or fewer steps. Suppose that the maximum number of premises of any
rule in X is ℓ. If k < m, and the set of formulas derivable in k steps has been
computed, then we may evidently compute the number of formulas derivable in
k + 1 steps in time O(mℓ+1).
Note that Proposition 3.2 does not apply to indirect derivation relations.
However, we do have a weaker global complexity bound, even in this case. If
Φ is set of L-sentences, we say that Φ is complete if, for every L-sentence ϕ
featuring only the atoms occurring in Φ, either ϕ ∈ Φ or ϕ¯ ∈ Φ. Trivially, every
satisfiable set of L-sentences can be extended to a complete, satisfiable set of
L-sentences. (Do not confuse this observation with Lemma 3.4.)
Proposition 3.3. Let L be a syllogistic language, X a finite set of syllogis-
tic rules in L, and Ψ a complete set of L-sentences. If Ψ X ⊥, then Ψ ⊢X
⊥. Hence, if X is sound and complete, the satisfiability problem for L is in
NPTime.
Proof. For the first statement, suppose that there is an indirect derivation of
some absurdity ⊥ from Ψ, using the rules X. Let the number of applications of
(RAA) employed in this derivation be k; and assume without loss of generality
that ⊥ is chosen so that this number k is minimal. If k > 0, consider the
last application of (RAA) in this derivation, which derives a formula, say, ψ¯,
discharging a premise ψ. Then there is an (indirect) derivation of some absurdity
⊥′ from Ψ∪{ψ}, employing fewer than k applications of (RAA). By minimality
of k, ψ 6∈ Ψ, and so, by the completeness of Ψ, ψ¯ ∈ Ψ. But then we can
replace our original derivation of ψ¯ with the trivial derivation, so obtaining a
derivation of ⊥ from Ψ with fewer than k applications of (RAA), a contradiction.
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Therefore, k = 0, or, in other words, Ψ ⊢X ⊥. For the second statement, let
a set of L-sentences Φ be given. Now guess a complete superset Ψ involving
only those atoms occurring in Φ. Evidently, |Ψ| is bounded by a polynomial
function of |Φ|. By Proposition 3.2, we can check in polynomial time whether
Ψ ⊢X ⊥.
We mentioned above that the existence of sound and complete syllogistic
systems for the languages S and S† has been solved. More specifically, it is
shown in Pratt-Hartmann and Moss [8], that, for both languages, a finite set
of rules exist for which the associated direct derivation relation is sound and
complete. (The earlier work cited above showed only the existence of sound
and refutation-complete systems for S.) We are now in a position to state the
technical results of this paper:
1. There is no finite set X of syllogistic rules in H such that ⊢X is sound and
complete (Theorem 4.1).
2. There is a finite set H of syllogistic rules in H such that ⊢H is sound and
refutation-complete (Theorem 5.1).
3. The problem of determining whether a set of H†-formulas is satisfiable is
NPTime-complete, and similarly for the problem of determining whether
a set of H∗†-formulas is satisfiable (Theorem 6.1). Hence, by Proposi-
tion 3.2, unless PTime=NPTime, there is no finite set X of syllogistic
rules in either H† or H∗† such that ⊢X is sound and refutation-complete.
4. There is a finite set H† of syllogistic rules in H† such that H† is sound
and complete (Theorem 7.1).
5. There is a finite set H∗† of syllogistic rules in H∗† such that H∗† is sound
and complete (Theorem 7.2).
The following sections of this paper are devoted to proofs of these results. We
round of the present section by establishing a version of the Lindenbaum Lemma
for indirect derivation relations. This result will be used in Section 7.
Lemma 3.4. Let L be a syllogistic language, X a finite set of syllogistic rules in
L, and Φ a set of L-formulas. If Φ is X-consistent, then Φ has a X-consistent,
complete extension.
Proof. Enumerate the L-formulas as ϕ0, ϕ1, . . .. Define Φ0 = Φ, and
Φi+1 =
{
Φ ∪ {ϕi} if Φ 6X ϕ¯i
Φ ∪ {ϕ¯i} otherwise,
for all i > 0. We show by induction that each Φi is consistent. From this it
follows that Φ∗ =
⋃
06i Φi is consistent, thus proving the lemma. The case
i = 0 is true by hypothesis; so we suppose that Φi is consistent, but Φi+1
inconsistent, and derive a contradiction. Assume first that Φi 6X ϕ¯i. Thus,
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Φi+1 = Φ ∪ {ϕi} X ⊥, whence, by the rule (RAA), Φi X ϕ¯i, contrary to
assumption. On the other hand, assume Φi X ϕ¯i, so that Φi+1 = Φi ∪ {ϕ¯i}.
Take derivations establishing that Φi X ϕ¯i and that Φi∪{ϕ¯i} X ⊥; and chain
these together to form a single derivation, thus:
Φi,
Φi....
ϕ¯i....
⊥ .
This establishes that Φi X ⊥, contrary to the supposed consistency of Φ.
4 No complete syllogistic systems for H
The objective of this section is to prove
Theorem 4.1. There is no finite set X of syllogistic rules in H such that ⊢X is
sound and complete.
We use a variant of a technique from Pratt-Hartmann and Moss [8]. For
n > 3, let Γn be the set of formulas
∀(pi, ∀pi+1) (1 6 i < n) (12)
∀(p1, ∀pn) (13)
∀(pn, ∀p1) (14)
∀(pi, pi) (1 6 i 6 n) (15)
∀(p1, p¯n−1) (16)
and let γn be the formula ∀(p1, pn). Note that the Formulas (13) and (14) are
logically equivalent, that Formulas (15) are true in every structure, and that
Formula (16) is an immediate consequence of (12) (putting i = n− 1) and (13).
Further, Γn |= γn. To see this, suppose for contradiction that A |= Γn, but
a ∈ pA1 \ p
A
n . Since p
A
1 6= ∅, the formulas (12) ensure that p
A
i 6= ∅ for all i
(1 6 i 6 n). By (13), then, a is the unique element of pAn . But this contradicts
the fact that a 6∈ pAn . We proceed to show that, for any finite set X of syllogistic
rules, if ⊢X is sound, then there exists a value of n such that Γn 6⊢X γn.
For any h, 1 6 h 6 n− 2, define Γnh = Γ
n \ {∀(ph, ∀ph+1)}.
Lemma 4.2. Let ϕ be an H-formula featuring only the atoms p1, . . . , pn, and
let 1 6 h 6 n− 2. Then either Γnh 6|= ϕ or ϕ ∈ Γ
n.
Proof. We consider the possible forms of ϕ in turn.
1. ϕ = ∀(pi, pj): Let A = {a1, . . . , an−1}, and define the structure A over A by
setting
pAk = {ak} (1 6 k < n), p
A
n = {a1}.
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A routine check shows that A |= Γnh, but, for i 6= j and {i, j} 6= {1, n}, A 6|= ϕ.
On the other hand, if i = j then, from (15), ϕ ∈ Γn. This means we need only
deal with the case {i, j} = {1, n}. For all h (1 6 h 6 n−2), let Ch = {a1, . . . , ah}
and Dh = {ah+1, . . . , an}, and define the structures Ch and Dh by setting:
pChk = {ak} (1 6 k 6 h) p
Ch
k = ∅ (h < k 6 n)
pDhk = ∅ (1 6 k 6 h) p
Dh
k = {ak} (h < k 6 n).
A routine check shows that Ch |= Γnh and Dh |= Γ
n
h, but that Ch 6|= ∀(p1, pn)
and Dh 6|= ∀(pn, p1).
2. ϕ = ∃(pi, c): It is immediate that
Ch 6|= ∃(pi, c) (h < i < n and c any c-term)
Dh 6|= ∃(pi, c) (1 6 i 6 h and c any c-term)
Hence, if i 6 h, Dh |= Γnh, but Dh 6|= ϕ; if i > h, Ch |= Γ
n
h, but Ch 6|= ϕ.
3. ϕ = ∀(pi, p¯j): Given that the formulas ∀(pi, p¯j) and ∀(pj , p¯i) are identified in
this paper, we may assume without loss of generality that i 6 j. If i = j, or if
i = 1 and j = n, then A 6|= ϕ. If i = 1 and j = n− 1, then, from (16), we have
ϕ ∈ Γn. We next suppose that either 1 6 i < j 6 n− 2, or 2 6 i < j 6 n− 1.
For such values of i and j, define Ai,j over A by setting
pAk = {ak} (1 6 k < n) and k 6= i, p
A
i = {ai, aj}, p
A
n = {a1}.
Thus, Ai,j is just like A, except that the element ai additionally realizes the
predicate pj . A routine check shows that Ai,j |= Γnh, but Ai,j 6|= ϕ. (Note that
Ai,j is not defined if j = n or if i = 1 and j = n − 1.) We next suppose that
2 6 i 6 n − 2 and j = n. Define Ai to be just like A, except that the first
element a1 additionally realizes the predicate pi. A routine check shows that
Ai |= Γnh, but Ai 6|= ϕ. (Note that Ai is not defined if i = 1 or n− 1 6 i 6 n.)
The only remaining case is where i = n − 1 and j = n. Define the structure
D′h to be just like Dh, except that an−1 additionally satisfies the predicate pn.
Again, a routine check shows that D′h |= Γ
n
h, but D 6|= ϕ.
4. ϕ = ∀(pi, ∀pj): Given that Formulas (13) and (14) are the only formulas of
this form in Γn, we may assume without loss of generality that i 6 j, and also
that either 1 < i or j < n. If 1 6 i < j 6 n and {i, j} 6= {1, n}, then A 6|= ϕ.
This leaves only the case where i = j. Denote by 2× Ch the resulting of taking
two disjoint copies of Ch, and similarly for 2×Dh. A routine check shows that
2× Ch |= Γnh and 2×Dh |= Γ
n
h. On the other hand
2× Ch 6|= ∀(pi, ∀pi) 1 6 i 6 h
2×Dh 6|= ∀(pi, ∀pi) h < i < n.
Thus, if i = j 6 h, then 2× Ch 6|= ϕ, and if i = j > h, then 2×Dh 6|= ϕ.
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5. ϕ = ∀(pi, ∀pj): If i = j, then A 6|= ϕ. If j = i + 1, then, from (12), ϕ ∈ Γn.
If 1 6 i 6 h < j 6 n, then Ch 6|= ϕ. If 1 6 j 6 h < i 6 n, then Dh 6|= ϕ. If
1 6 i 6 h, 1 6 j 6 h and j 6= i + 1, let the structure Ch,i,j be just like Ch,
except that aj additionally satisfies the predicate pi. A routine check shows
that Ch,i,j |= Γ
n
h, but Ch,i,j 6|= ϕ. (Note that Ch,i,j is not defined if j = i + 1.)
Similarly, if h < i 6 n, h < j 6 n and j 6= i+ 1, let the structure Dh,i,j be just
like Dh, except that aj additionally satisfies the predicate pi. Again, we have
Dh,i,j |= Γnh , but Dh,i,j 6|= ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let X be a finite (non-empty) set of syllogistic rules such
that ⊢X is sound. Let the maximum number of antecedents in any of the rules
of X be r > 0, fix n = r + 3, and let θ be any H-formula featuring only the
atoms p1, . . . , pn. We claim that Γ
(n) ⊢X θ implies θ ∈ Γn. Since γn 6∈ Γn, this
proves the theorem.
We prove the claim by induction on the lengths of derivations. By Lemma 3.1, if
there is a derivation of γn from Γn, then there is such a derivation using only the
atoms p1, . . . , pn. Henceforth, then, we confine ourselves to derivations featuring
only these atoms. Now, for derivations employing no steps of inference—i.e. for
θ ∈ Γn—the claim is trivial. So suppose that the claim holds for derivations
employing at most p steps, and that θ is derived from Γ in p + 1 steps. By
inductive hypothesis, the antecedents of the final rule-instance will all be in Γn;
therefore, since n = r + 3, the antecedents of the final rule-instance will all be
in Γnh, for some h (1 6 h 6 n − 2). Since ⊢X is sound, Γ
n
h |= θ, whence, by
Lemma 4.2, θ ∈ Γn. This completes the inductive step, and the proof of the
theorem.
5 A refutation-complete syllogistic system for H
The objective of this section is to prove
Theorem 5.1. There is a finite set H of syllogistic rules in H such that the
direct derivation relation ⊢H is sound and refutation-complete.
We display H in schematic form, with o, p and q ranging over atoms, and c
over c-terms, as usual. The rule-schemata fall naturally into four groups.
1. ‘little’ rules:
∃(p, c)
∃(p, p)
(I)
∀(p, p)
(T);
2. rules similar to familiar syllogisms:
∀(p, q) ∀(q, c)
∀(p, c)
(B)
∃(p, q) ∀(q, c)
∃(p, c)
(D1)
∃(p, c) ∀(p, q)
∃(q, c)
(D2)
∃(p, c) ∀(q, c¯)
∃(p, q¯)
(D3);
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3. ‘little’ rules for universally quantified predicates:
∃(p, ∀q)
∀(q, p)
(H1)
∃(p, ∀q)
∀(q, ∀q)
(H2)
∃(p, ∀q)
∃(q, ∀p)
(H3);
4. syllogism-like rules for universally quantified predicates
∃(q, c) ∃(p, ∀q)
∀(q, c)
(HH1)
∃(p, c) ∀(p, ∀q)
∀(q, c)
(HH2)
∀(p, c) ∃(p, ∀q)
∀(q, c)
(HH3)
∀(p, ∀q) ∃(q, q)
∀(p, q)
(HH4).
Note that these rule-schemata define a finite set of rules, as explained above.
Our choice of labels (I), (T), etc. is essentially arbitrary, though (B), (D1),
(D2) and (D3) allude vaguely to the classical syllogisms Barbara and Darii.
Recalling our decision silently to identify the formulas ∀(p, c) and ∀(c¯, p¯), (D3)
could be alternatively written as {∃(p, c), ∀(c, q¯)}/∃(p, q¯). Validity of these rules
is transparent: Rule (HH1) is a straightforward generalization of the validity (7)
considered above; the other ‘Hamiltonian’ rules are dealt with similarly.
Let Φ be a set of H-formulas containing at least one existential formula, such
that Φ is consistent with respect to ⊢H. In the following lemmas, we build a
structure A, and show that A |= Φ. Since H is the only set of rules we shall be
concerned with in this section, we write ⊢ for the direct proof-relation ⊢H. We
remind the reader that the variables o, p and q are silently assumed to range
only over atoms, and the variables c and d over c-terms.
Let S be a set of c-terms. We define S∗ to be the smallest set of c-terms
including S such that, for all atoms p, q and all c-terms c:
p ∈ S∗ and Φ ⊢ ∀(p, c)⇒ c ∈ S∗ (C1)
(∀p) ∈ S∗ and Φ ⊢ ∃(p, p)⇒ p ∈ S∗. (C2)
Evidently, we may regard S∗ as the limit of a process in which, starting with
S, c-terms are added one by one to ensure fulfillment of the above conditions.
More precisely, we may write S∗ =
⋃
06i<α S
(i), where S(0) = S, α 6 ω, and,
for all i (i+1 < α), S(i+1) = S(i) ∪ {c} for some c 6∈ S(i) satisfying either of the
following conditions:
there exists p ∈ S(i) such that Φ ⊢ ∀(p, c); (K1)
c = p is an atom such that (∀p) ∈ S(i), and Φ ⊢ ∃(p, p). (K2)
Define the set W to be the following set of c-terms:
W0 = {{p, c}
∗ | Φ ⊢ ∃(p, c)}
Wi+1 = {{p}
∗ | ∀p ∈ w for some w ∈Wi} (i > 0)
W =
⋃
i>0
Wi.
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Since Φ contains at least one existential formula, W is non-empty. We use
letters u, v, w to range over elements of W . Lemmas 5.2–5.7 establish some
properties of W .
Lemma 5.2. Let c ∈ w ∈W . Then there exists o ∈ w such that Φ ⊢ ∃(o, c).
Proof. Assume first that w ∈ W0. Thus, w = {o, d}∗, where Φ ⊢ ∃(o, d). Using
the representation w =
⋃
06i<α S
(i), where S(0) = {o, d}, we show by induction
on i that, if c ∈ S(i) ∈W , there exists o ∈ w such that Φ ⊢ ∃(o, c).
For i = 0, we have c = d or c = o. In the former case, Φ ⊢ ∃(o, c), by assumption.
In the latter, we have the derivation
....
∃(o, d)
∃(o, o)
(I),
so that, either way, Φ ⊢ ∃(o, c). For i > 1, we consider the following cases,
corresponding to the conditions (K1)–(K2).
1. Φ ⊢ ∀(q, c) for some q ∈ S(i−1): By inductive hypothesis, there exists o ∈ w
such that Φ ⊢ ∃(o, q), so we have the derivation
....
∃(o, q)
....
∀(q, c)
∃(o, c)
(D1).
2. c = q, ∀q ∈ S(i−1), and Φ ⊢ ∃(q, q): But then there is nothing to show, since
we may put o = q.
This completes the proof of the lemma for w ∈ W0. We now prove the result
for w ∈ Wk, for all k > 0, proceeding by induction on k. For k > 0, we have
w = {o}∗, where, for some v ∈ Wk−1, ∀o ∈ v. By inductive hypothesis, there
exists p ∈ v such that Φ ⊢ ∃(p, ∀o), so we have the derivation
....
∃(p, ∀o)
∃(o, ∀p)
(H3)
∃(o, o)
(I).
Having established that Φ ⊢ ∃(o, o), we can proceed exactly as for the case
k = 0, writing w =
⋃
06i<α S
(i), where S(0) = {o}.
Lemma 5.3. Let p ∈ w ∈W . Then Φ ⊢ ∃(p, p).
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Proof. By Lemma 5.2, let o be such that Φ ⊢ ∃(o, p). Then we have the deriva-
tion ....
∃(o, p)
∃(p, p)
(I).
Lemma 5.4. If c ∈ {p}∗, then Φ ⊢ ∀(p, c).
Proof. Write {p}∗ =
⋃
06i<α S
(i), with S(0) = {p}, as in the proof of Lemma 5.2;
we show that the lemma holds for c ∈ S(i), proceeding by induction on i.
If i = 0, then c = p, so Φ ⊢ ∀(p, c) by rule (T). If i > 1, we again have two cases
corresponding to the conditions (K1) and (K2).
1. Φ ⊢ ∀(q, c) for some q ∈ S(i−1): By inductive hypothesis, Φ ⊢ ∀(p, q), so we
have the derivation ....
∀(p, q)
....
∀(q, c)
∀(p, c)
(B).
2. c = q, ∀q ∈ S(i−1), and Φ ⊢ ∃(q, q): By inductive hypothesis, Φ ⊢ ∀(p, ∀q),
so we have the derivation
....
∀(p, ∀q)
....
∃(q, q)
∀(p, q)
(HH4).
In both cases, Φ ⊢ ∀(p, c), as required.
In the next lemma, we take ∀ to be the symbol ∃ and ∃ to be the symbol ∀.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose c, d ∈ w ∈ W with c, d distinct. Then there exist o ∈ w
and Q ∈ {∀, ∃} such that Φ ⊢ Q(o, c) and Φ ⊢ Q(o, d). Hence, if c ∈ w, then
c¯ 6∈ w.
Proof. We consider first the case w ∈W \W0. By construction of W , w = {o}
∗
for some atom o. By Lemma 5.3, Φ ⊢ ∃(o, o); and by Lemma 5.4, Φ ⊢ ∀(o, c)
and Φ ⊢ ∀(o, d). But then we have the derivation:
....
∃(o, o)
....
∀(o, d)
∃(o, d)
(D1).
Henceforth, then, we may suppose w ∈ W0, and we again write w =
⋃
06i<α S
(i),
as in the proof of Lemma 5.2. Note that S(0) = {o, c′}, for some atom o and
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c-term c′ such that Φ ⊢ ∃(o, c′). We prove the lemma for c ∈ S(i) and d ∈ S(j),
proceeding by induction on i+ j, showing in fact that the required o lies in S(0).
If i+j = 0—i.e., c, d ∈ S(0)—then, since c, d are distinct, we have {c, d} = {o, c′}
and w ∈ W0. The result then follows immediately from the fact that, by rule
(T), Φ ⊢ ∀(o, o). If i+ j > 0, assume without loss of generality that i > 0. We
again have two cases corresponding to the conditions (K1) and (K2).
1. Φ ⊢ ∀(q, c) for some q ∈ S(i−1): By inductive hypothesis, there exist o ∈ S(0)
and Q ∈ {∀, ∃} such that Φ ⊢ Q(o, q) and Φ ⊢ Q(o, d). We then have one of the
derivations:
....
∀(o, q)
....
∀(q, c)
∀(o, c)
(B)
....
∃(o, q)
....
∀(q, c)
∃(o, c)
(D1).
so that Φ ⊢ Q(o, c), as required.
2. c = q, ∀q ∈ S(i−1) and Φ ⊢ ∃(q, q): By inductive hypothesis, there exists
o ∈ S(0) and Q ∈ {∀, ∃} such that Φ ⊢ Q(o, ∀q) and Φ ⊢ Q(o, d). Then we have
one of the derivations
....
∀(o, ∀q)
....
∃(q, q)
∀(o, q)
(HH4)
....
∃(q, q)
....
∃(o, ∀q)
∀(q, o)
(H1)
∃(o, q)
(D1).
For the final statement of the lemma, suppose c ∈ w and c¯ ∈ w. Exchanging c
and c¯ if necessary, let o be such that Φ ⊢ ∃(o, c) and Φ ⊢ ∀(o, c¯). Then we have
the derivation ....
∃(o, c)
....
∀(o, c¯)
∃(o, o¯)
(D3),
contradicting the supposed consistency of Φ.
Lemma 5.6. Let p, c ∈ w ∈ W . Then Φ ⊢ ∃(p, c).
Proof. If p = c, we can apply Lemma 5.3. Otherwise, by Lemma 5.5, let o ∈ w
and Q ∈ {∀, ∃} be such that Φ ⊢ Q(o, p) and Φ ⊢ Q(o, c). Then we have one of
the derivations
....
∃(p, o)
....
∀(o, c)
∃(p, c)
(D1)
....
∃(o, c)
....
∀(o, p)
∃(p, c)
(D2).
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Lemma 5.7. Suppose u, v, w ∈ W with (∀q) ∈ u, (∀q) ∈ v and q ∈ w. Then
u = v.
Proof. By Lemma 5.3, Φ ⊢ ∃(q, q). By (C2), then, q ∈ v. Suppose c ∈ u, where
c 6= ∀q. (We already know that (∀q) ∈ v.) By Lemma 5.5, there exists o ∈ u
and Q ∈ {∀, ∃} such that Φ ⊢ Q(o, c) and Φ ⊢ Q(o, ∀q). Thus, we have one of
the derivations
....
∃(o, c)
....
∀(o, ∀q)
∀(q, c)
(HH2)
....
∀(o, c)
....
∃(o, ∀q)
∀(q, c)
(HH3),
whence, by (C1), c ∈ v. Thus, u ⊆ v. The reverse inclusion follows symmetri-
cally.
Say that w ∈W is special if w contains a c-term of the form ∀q such that Φ ⊢
∃(q, q). Intuitively, special elements are the unique instances of some property
q. We now build the structure A as follows:
A = {〈w, 0〉 | w ∈ W is special} ∪
{〈w, i〉 | w ∈ W is non-special, i ∈ {−1, 1}}
pA = {〈w, i〉 ∈ A | p ∈ w}, for any atom p.
We remark that, since W is non-empty, A is non-empty; so this construction is
legitimate.
Lemma 5.8. For all elements a = 〈w, i〉 ∈ A and all c-terms c, if c ∈ w, then
a ∈ cA.
Proof. We consider the possible forms of c in turn.
1. c = p is an atom: The result is immediate by construction of A.
2. c = p¯: If, also, p ∈ w, Lemma 5.6 guarantees that Φ ⊢ ∃(p, p¯), contradicting
the supposed consistency of Φ. Hence, p 6∈ w, whence, by the construction of
A, a ∈ (p¯)A.
3. c = ∀p: Suppose b = 〈u, j〉 ∈ A with b ∈ pA. By construction of A, p ∈ u,
so that Φ ⊢ ∃(p, p), by Lemma 5.3. Furthermore, by Lemma 5.2, for some o,
Φ ⊢ ∃(o, ∀q), so that we have the derivation
....
∃(o, ∀p)
∀(p, ∀p)
(H2),
whence (∀p) ∈ u by (C1). By Lemma 5.7, w = u, and therefore, by construction
of A, i = j = 0. Thus, b ∈ pA implies b = a, so that a ∈ cA.
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4. c = ∀p: Suppose c ∈ w, and assume for the time being that i 6= 0. Thus, w
is not special. By Lemma 5.2, there exists an atom q such that Φ ⊢ ∃(q, ∀p), so
that we have the derivation ....
∃(q, ∀p)
∃(p, ∀q)
(H3).
Then there exists w′ ∈ W0 ⊆ W such that p ∈ w′; and, by construction of A,
there exists i′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that both 〈w′, i′〉 ∈ qA and 〈w′,−i′〉 ∈ pA. Since
i 6= 0 we may suppose i 6= i′ (transpose i′ and −i′ if necessary), so that there
exists a′ ∈ A with a′ 6= a and a′ ∈ pA. Hence a ∈ cA, as required. Now assume
i = 0. Then w is special, so suppose (∀q) ∈ w, with Φ ⊢ ∃(q, q). By (C2), q ∈ w,
and by Lemma 5.6, Φ ⊢ ∃(q, ∀p). Again, therefore, by (H3), Φ ⊢ ∃(p, ∀q). By
the construction of W , there exists w′,∈ W0 such that p ∈ w′ and ∀q ∈ w′.
By construction of A, there exists i′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that 〈w′, i′〉 ∈ pA. Since
(∀q) ∈ w and ∀q ∈ w′, we know from the final statement of Lemma 5.5 that
w 6= w′, and therefore a 6= a′. Hence a ∈ cA, as required.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let H be as given above. Soundness of ⊢H is immediate
from the fact each of these rules is valid. For refutation-completeness, let Φ be
a set of H-formulas consistent with respect to ⊢H. If Φ contains no existential
formulas, then A |= Φ for any structure A in which pA = ∅ for all p ∈ P.
Otherwise, let A be constructed as above. It suffices to show that A |= Φ. To
see this, let ϕ ∈ Φ. If ϕ = ∃(p, c), then, by construction of W and A, there
exist w ∈ W and i ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that p, c ∈ w, and a = 〈w, i〉 ∈ A. By
Lemma 5.8, a ∈ pA ∩ cA so that A |= ϕ. On the other hand, if ϕ = ∀(p, c),
suppose a = 〈w, i〉 ∈ pA. By construction of A, p ∈ w, and by Condition (C1),
c ∈ w′, whence, by Lemma 5.8, a ∈ cA. Thus, pA ⊆ cA, so that A |= ϕ.
6 NPTime-completeness of H† and H∗†
The objective of this section is to prove
Theorem 6.1. The problem of determining whether a set of H†-formulas is
satisfiable is NPTime-complete, and similarly for the problem of determining
whether a set of H∗†-formulas is satisfiable.
From Theorem 6.1 and Proposition 3.2, it follows that, unless PTime =
NPTime, there is no finite set X of syllogistic rules in either H† or H∗† such
that ⊢X is sound and refutation-complete.
Membership of these problems in NPTime is easily established by showing
that any satisfiable set Φ of H∗†-formulas is satisfied in a structure whose size
is bounded by a polynomial function of the number of symbols in Φ. (Alter-
natively, the same result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 7.2 together
with Proposition 3.3.) Therefore, only the lower bounds need be considered.
We use a variant of a technique from McAllester and Givan [6]. We remark that
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our task would be very easy if we could write a set of H†-formulas whose only
models have cardinality 3. However, by Theorem 7.11, this is impossible.
The proof of NPTime-hardness proceeds by reduction of the problem 3SAT
to the satisfiability problem for H†. In this context, a clause is an expression
L1 ∨ L2 ∨ L3, where each Lk (1 6 k 6 3) is either a proposition letter o or a
negated proposition letter ¬o. Given an assignment θ of truth-values (t or f) to
proposition letters, any clause γ receives a truth-value θ(γ) in the obvious way.
An instance of the problem 3SAT is a set Γ of clauses; that instance is positive
just in case there exists a θ such that θ(γ) = t for every γ ∈ Γ. Let Γ be a
finite set of clauses. We show how to compute, in logarithmic space, a set Φ of
H†-formulas such that Φ is satisfiable if and only if Γ is a positive instance of
3SAT. To make the proof easier, we work first with H∗†-formulas, strengthening
the result at the very end of the proof.
First, we need formulas to represent proposition letters. For each proposition
letter o occurring in Γ, let ot and of be atoms (elements of P), and let Φo be
the set of H∗†-formulas:
∀(∀ot, ∀of ) ∀(ot, ∀of ) ∀(ot, of ).
Intuitively, if A |= Φo, we are to interpret the equation oAt = ∅ as stating that o
is true, and oAf = ∅ as stating that o is false. The following lemma justifies this
interpretation. Suppose A and B are structures and p ∈ P. We say that A and
B agree on p if pA = pB. Note that if A ⊆ B, then A and B agree on p just in
case pB \A = ∅.
Lemma 6.2. If A |= Φo, then oAt = ∅ if and only if o
A
f 6= ∅. Conversely,
suppose A is a 2-element set, and v ∈ {t, f}. There exists a structure Avo over
A such that, if B ⊇ Avo agrees with A
v
o on ot and of , then B |= Φo; furthermore,
(ov)B = ∅.
Proof. For the first statement, suppose A |= Φo. From ∀(ot, ∀of ) and ∀(ot, of ),
it is obvious that we cannot have both oAt 6= ∅ and o
A
t 6= ∅. On the other
hand, suppose oAt = ∅. Then every element satisfies ∀ot, and so some element
does, whence, from ∀(∀ot, ∀of ), that element is distinct from some oAf , so that
oAf 6= ∅. For the second statement, let A = {a, b}. Define the structure A
t
o by
setting (ot)
A
t
o = ∅ and (of )A
t
o = A; similarly, define the structure Afo by setting
(of )
A
f
o = ∅ and (ot)A
f
o = A. A routine check shows that these structures have
the specified properties.
Next, we need formulas to represent clauses. For each clause γ = L1 ∨ L2 ∨
L3 ∈ Γ, let sγ,1, sγ,2, sγ,3, sγ,4, pγ,1, pγ,2 and pγ,3 be atoms (elements of P); in
addition, let Φγ be the set of H†-formulas:
∀(sγ,1, ∀pγ,1) ∀(pγ,1, sγ,2)
∀(sγ,2, ∀pγ,2) ∀(pγ,2, sγ,3)
∀(sγ,3, ∀pγ,3) ∀(pγ,3, sγ,4)
∃(sγ,1, s¯γ,4).
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Intuitively, if A |= Φγ we are to interpret the equation pAγ,k = ∅ as stating that
Lk is true (1 6 k 6 3). The next lemma justifies this interpretation.
Lemma 6.3. If A |= Φγ, then the set of numbers k (1 6 k 6 3) such that
(pγ,k)
A = ∅ is non-empty. Conversely, suppose A is a 2-element set, and K a
non-empty subset of {1, 2, 3}. There exists a structure AKγ over A such that, if
B ⊇ AKγ agrees with A
K
γ on the atoms in {sγ,1, sγ,2, sγ,3, sγ,4, pγ,1, pγ,2, pγ,3},
then B |= Φγ; furthermore, for all k (1 6 k 6 3), (pγ,k)B = ∅ if and only if
k ∈ K.
Proof. For the first statement, suppose, for contradiction, that A |= Φγ , but
(pγ,k)
A 6= ∅, for all k (1 6 k 6 3). Since A |= ∃(sγ,1, s¯γ,4), let a ∈ sAγ,1 \ s
A
γ,4.
Since A |= ∀(sγ,1, ∀pγ,1), and neither sAγ,1 nor p
A
γ,1 is empty, we have a ∈ p
A
γ,1;
moreover, since, A |= ∀(pγ,1, sγ,2), a ∈ sAγ,2 \ s
A
γ,4. Repeating the same reasoning
twice over, a ∈ sAγ,4 \ s
A
γ,4, a contradiction.
For the second statement of the lemma, let A = {a, b}, and define AKγ
according to the following table.
K atoms satisfied by a atoms satisfied by b
{1} sγ,1 pγ,2, pγ,3, sγ,3, sγ,4
{2} pγ,1, sγ,1, sγ,2 pγ,3, sγ,4
{3} pγ,1, pγ,2, sγ,1, sγ,2, sγ,3 -
{2, 3} pγ,1, sγ1 , sγ2 -
{1, 3} pγ,2, sγ1 , sγ3 -
{1, 2} sγ,1 pγ,3, sγ,4
{1, 2, 3} sγ1 -
An exhaustive check shows that AKγ has the required properties.
Finally, we need formulas to link proposition letters and clauses. For each
clause γ = L1 ∨ L2 ∨ L3 ∈ Γ, and for all k (1 6 k 6 3), let the H†-formula ψγ,k
be given by
ψγ,k =
{
∀(ot, ∀pγ,k) if Lk = o
∀(of , ∀pγ,k) if Lk = ¬o,
and let Ψγ = {ψγ,1, ψγ,2, ψγ,3}.
Lemma 6.4. Suppose A |= Ψγ , and (pγ,k)A = ∅. If Lk = o, then oAt = ∅; and
if Lk = ¬o, then (of )A = ∅.
Proof. Immediate.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We need only show NPTime-hardness. To this end, let
Γ be a set of clauses over the proposition letters occurring Γ. Let
Φ =
⋃
{Φo | o occurs in Γ} ∪
⋃
{Φγ ∪Ψγ | γ ∈ Γ}.
We claim that Φ is satisfiable if and only if Γ is. For suppose A |= ϕ. Define the
truth-value assignment θ over the proposition letters of Γ by setting θ(o) = t
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just in case oAt = ∅. It follows from Lemma 6.2 that, if o is any proposition letter
mentioned in Γ, then θ(o) = f just in case oAf = ∅. Now let γ = L1 ∨L2 ∨L3 be
a clause in Γ. By Lemma 6.3, for all γ ∈ Γ, there exists a k (1 6 k 6 3) such
that pAγk = ∅. By Lemma 6.4: if Lk = o, then o
A
t = ∅, so that θ(γ) = θ(o) = t;
and if Lk = ¬o, then oAf = ∅, so that θ(γ) = θ(¬o) = t. Either way, θ(γ) = t.
Conversely, suppose θ is a truth-value assignment such that θ(γ) = t for all
γ ∈ Γ. For all o occurring in Γ, let Ao be the structure A
θ(o)
o over domain Ao
guaranteed by Lemma 6.2. For each γ = L1∨L2 ∨L3 ∈ Γ, the set K = {k | 1 6
k 6 3 and θ(Lk) = t} is non-empty; so let Aγ be the structure AKγ over domain
Aγ guaranteed by Lemma 6.3. Assume the domains of all these structures are
disjoint, and let
B =
⋃
{Ao | o occurs in Γ} ∪
⋃
{Aγ | γ ∈ Γ}.
Thus, for all o occurring in Γ, B agrees with Ao on the atoms ot and of ,
whence B |= Φo. Likewise, for all γ ∈ Γ, B agrees with Aγ on the atoms in
{sγ,1, sγ,2, sγ,3, sγ,4, pγ,1, pγ,2, pγ,3}, whence B |= Φγ . It remains to show that
B |= Ψγ for each γ ∈ Γ. Suppose γ = L1 ∨ L2 ∨ L3 ∈ Γ, and 1 6 k 6 3.
If Lk = o, then ψγ,k = ∀(ot, ∀pγ,k). Take any a ∈ oBt . By the construction
of B, a ∈ Ao, and θ(o) = f , whence θ(Lk) = f , whence, by the construction
of B again, pBγ,k ∩ Aγ 6= ∅. Since Ao and Aγ are disjoint, B |= ψγ,k. On the
other hand, if Lk = ¬o, then ψγ,k = ∀(of , ∀pγ,k). Take any a ∈ oBf . By the
construction of B, a ∈ Ao, and θ(o) = t, whence θ(Lk) = f , whence, by the
construction of B again, pBγ,k ∩Aγ 6= ∅. Since Ao and Aγ are disjoint, we again
have B |= ψγ,k. Thus, B |= Φ. This establishes the NPTime-hardness of the
satisfiability problem for H∗†.
To extend the result to H†, note that the only formulas of Φ not in H† are
those the forms ∀(∀ot, ∀of ) occurring in Φo. But we can simply replace any such
formula, equisatisfiably, by the pair of formulas ∀(q, ∀of ), ∀(q¯, ∀ot), where q is
a fresh atom.
7 Complete indirect syllogistic systems for H†
and H∗†
The objective of this section is to prove
Theorem 7.1. There is a finite set H† of syllogistic rules in H† such that the
indirect derivation relation H† is sound and complete.
Theorem 7.2. There is a finite set H∗† of syllogistic rules in H∗† such that the
indirect derivation relation H∗† is sound and complete.
We present first the proof of Theorem 7.1. The proof of Theorem 7.2 proceeds
similarly (and in fact more simply); we indicate merely the differences between
the two proofs.
Let H† consist of the following rules:
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1. ‘little’ rules:
∃(ℓ, c)
∃(ℓ, ℓ)
(I)
∀(ℓ, ℓ)
(T)
∀(c, ℓ) ∀(c, ℓ¯)
∀(c,m)
(A)
∀(ℓ, ℓ¯)
∃(ℓ¯, ℓ¯)
(N);
2. generalizations of classical syllogisms:
∀(ℓ,m) ∀(m, c)
∀(ℓ, c)
(B1)
∀(ℓ, c) ∀(c,m)
∀(ℓ,m)
(B2)
∃(ℓ,m) ∀(m, c)
∃(ℓ, c)
(D1)
∃(ℓ, c) ∀(c,m)
∃(ℓ,m)
(D2);
3. the ‘Hamiltonian’ rules:
∃(ℓ, c) ∃(m, ∀ℓ)
∀(ℓ, c)
(HH1)
∃(m, ∀ℓ)
∀(ℓ, ∀ℓ)
(H2)
∃(ℓ, ∀m)
∃(m, ∀ℓ)
(H3)
∃(ℓ, ℓ)
∀(ℓ¯, ∀ℓ)
(H4).
To avoid unnecessary proliferation of rule-names, those rules which are simple
generalizations of rules in H have been given the same names. Again, establish-
ing the validity of the rules in H† is straightforward. Rule (A) is valid because
its premises imply that nothing is a c; we cannot replace (A) with the simpler
schema ∀(c, c¯)/∀(c,m), because, if c is not a literal, ∀(c, c¯) is not in the language
H†. Rule (N)—no analogue of which can be formulated in the language H—is
valid because of the assumption that domains are non-empty: if no ℓs are ℓs,
then everything is a non-ℓ, and so something is a non-ℓ. Rule (T) can in fact
be viewed as a special case of the rule (RAA), since we have the derivation
[∃(ℓ, ℓ¯)]1
∀(ℓ, ℓ)
(RAA)1.
But we retain (T) as a separate rule for clarity.
Let Φ be a complete set ofH†-formulas such that Φ is consistent with respect
to ⊢H† . In the following lemmas, we build a structure A, and show that A |= Φ.
Since H† is the only set of rules we shall be concerned with in the ensuing
lemmas, until further notice we write ⊢ for the direct proof-relation ⊢H† .
The elements of A are constructed using sets of c-terms. Call a set S of c-
terms consistent if, for every c-term c, c ∈ S implies c¯ 6∈ S, and literal-complete
if, for every literal ℓ, ℓ 6∈ S implies ℓ¯ ∈ S. Notice that the notion of consistency
for sets of c-terms is not the same as ⊢-consistency for sets of formulas; likewise,
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literal-completeness for sets of c-terms is not the same as completeness for sets
of formulas. Let S be any set of c-terms. Define
S∗ = S ∪ {c | there exists ℓ ∈ S such that Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓ, c)}∪
{ℓ | there exists c ∈ S such that Φ ⊢ ∀(c, ℓ)}.
and we call S closed if S = S∗. Trivially, S ⊆ S∗.
Lemma 7.3. Let S be a set of c-terms. Then S∗ is closed.
Proof. We suppose d ∈ (S∗)∗ \S∗, and derive a contradiction. We consider first
the case where d = m is a literal. By definition, there exists c ∈ S∗ such that
Φ ⊢ ∀(c,m). Certainly, c 6∈ S, for otherwise, we would have d ∈ S∗. Suppose
first that c is not a literal. Then there exists ℓ ∈ S such that Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓ, c), and
we have the derivation ....
∀(ℓ, c)
....
∀(c,m)
∀(ℓ,m)
(B2),
so that m ∈ S∗, a contradiction. On the other hand, suppose c = ℓ is a literal.
Then there exists a c-term c0 ∈ S such that Φ ⊢ ∀(c0, ℓ). Taking account of the
equivalence of ∀(e, f) and ∀(f¯ , e¯), we have the derivation
....
∀(m¯, ℓ¯)
....
∀(ℓ¯, c¯0)
∀(m¯, c¯0)
(B1),
i.e. Φ ⊢ ∀(c0,m), so that m ∈ S∗, a contradiction. The case where d is not a
literal proceeds similarly (in fact, more simply).
Lemma 7.4. Every closed, consistent set of c-terms containing at least one
literal has a closed, consistent, literal-complete extension.
Proof. Enumerate the literals as ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , and suppose S is closed and consis-
tent. Define S(0) = S, and
S(i+1) =
{
(S(i) ∪ {ℓi})∗ if ℓ¯i 6∈ S(i)
S(i) otherwise,
for all i > 0. It follows from Lemma 7.3 that each S(i) is closed; we show
by induction that it is also consistent. From this it follows that
⋃
06i S
(i) is
consistent, thus proving the lemma. The case i = 0 is true by hypothesis;
so we suppose that S(i) is consistent, but S(i+1) inconsistent, and derive a
contradiction. Let m0 be a literal in S
(0), and hence in S(i); and let c be a
c-term such that c, c¯ ∈ S(i+1). Since S(i) is consistent, by exchanging c and
c¯ if necessary, we may assume that c 6∈ S(i). And since S(i) is also closed,
we know that either c = ℓi or Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓi, c). Indeed, by rule (T), the latter
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case subsumes the former. Therefore, c¯ 6∈ S(i), since, otherwise, we would have
d = c¯ ∈ S(i) such that Φ ⊢ ∀(d, ℓ¯i), whence ℓ¯i ∈ S(i), contrary to assumption.
Since c¯ ∈ S(i+1), it follows—again taking account of rule (T)—that Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓi, c¯).
But then we have the derivation
∀(ℓi, ℓi)
(T)
....
∀(ℓi, c)
....
∀(c, ℓ¯i)
∀(ℓi, ℓ¯i)
(B2)
∀(ℓi, m¯0)
(A),
so that Φ ⊢ ∀(m0, ℓ¯i), again contrary to the fact that S(i) 6= S(i+1).
Denote by W the set of all closed, consistent and literal-complete sets of
c-terms. In the sequel, we use the variables u, v, w to range over W .
Lemma 7.5. Suppose Φ ⊢ ∃(ℓ, c). Then there exists w ∈W such that ℓ, c ∈ w.
Proof. By Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4, we need only show that {ℓ, c}∗ is consistent.
So suppose otherwise. Since Φ is ⊢-consistent, c 6= ℓ¯. We therefore have the
following possible cases: (i) Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓ, c¯); (ii) there exists d such that Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓ, d)
and Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓ, d¯); (iii) there exists d such that Φ ⊢ ∀(ℓ, d) and Φ ⊢ ∀(c, d¯); (iv)
there exists d such that Φ ⊢ ∀(c, d) and Φ ⊢ ∀(c, d¯). Note that, in Cases (iii)
and (iv), one of c or d must be a literal. In Case (i), Rule (D2) immediately
yields Φ ⊢ ∃(ℓ, ℓ¯). In Case (ii), we have the derivation:
....
∃(ℓ, c)
∃(ℓ, ℓ)
(I)
....
∀(ℓ, d¯)
∃(ℓ, d¯)
(D1)
....
∀(d¯, ℓ¯)
∃(ℓ, ℓ¯)
(D2).
Likewise, in case (iii), we have the derivation:
....
∃(ℓ, c)
....
∀(c, d¯)
∃(ℓ, d¯)
(D1) or (D2)
....
∀(d¯, ℓ¯)
∃(ℓ, ℓ¯)
(D1) or (D2).
In Case (iv), if c is a literal, we proceed as in Case (ii), but with ℓ and c
exchanged; and if d = m is a literal, we have the derivation:
....
∃(ℓ, c)
....
∀(c,m)
....
∀(c, m¯)
∀(c, ℓ¯)
(A)
∃(ℓ, ℓ¯)
(D2).
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Since all cases contradict the supposed ⊢-consistency of Φ, the lemma is proved.
Lemma 7.6. The set W is not empty.
Proof. By Lemma 7.5, it is necessary only to show that Φ ⊢ ∃(ℓ, c) for some ℓ
and c. Pick any ℓ. If ∃(ℓ, ℓ) ∈ Φ, we are done. Otherwise, by completeness of
Φ, ∀(ℓ, ℓ¯) ∈ Φ, so that, by Rule (N), Φ ⊢ ∃(ℓ¯, ℓ¯), completing the proof.
The following lemma is the analogue, for the system H†, of Lemma 5.6. This
time, however, the lemma is trivial, because we are assuming that Φ is complete.
Lemma 7.7. Suppose ℓ, c ∈ w ∈W . Then ∃(ℓ, c) ∈ Φ.
Proof. Suppose ∃(ℓ, c) 6∈ Φ. By the completeness of Φ, ∀(ℓ, c¯) ∈ Φ, whence
c¯ ∈ w, because w is closed. This contradicts the consistency of w.
Lemma 7.8. Suppose w ∈ W , and (∀ℓ) ∈ w, where Φ ⊢ ∃(ℓ, ℓ). Then ℓ ∈ w.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. By the literal-completeness of w, ℓ¯ ∈ w. But we
have the derivation
∃(ℓ, ℓ)
∀(ℓ¯, ∀ℓ)
(H4),
so that, since w is closed, ∀ℓ ∈ w, contradicting the consistency of w.
Lemma 7.9. Suppose u, v, w ∈ W with (∀ℓ) ∈ u, (∀ℓ) ∈ v and ℓ ∈ w. Then
u = v.
Proof. By Lemma 7.7, Φ |= ∃(ℓ, ℓ). By Lemma 7.8, ℓ ∈ w and ℓ ∈ v. Suppose
also c ∈ u. By Lemma 7.7 again, ∃(ℓ, c) ∈ Φ, and ∃(ℓ, ∀ℓ) ∈ Φ. Therefore, we
have the derivation
∃(ℓ, c) ∃(ℓ, ∀ℓ)
∀(ℓ, c)
(HH1),
and c ∈ v. Thus, u ⊆ v. The reverse inclusion follows symmetrically.
Analogously to Section 5, we call w ∈ W special if it contains a c-term of
the form ∀ℓ such that Φ ⊢ ∃(ℓ, ℓ); and we build the structure A as follows:
A = {〈w, 0〉 | w ∈ W is special} ∪
{〈w, i〉 | w ∈ W is non-special, i ∈ {−1, 1}}
pA = {〈w, i〉 ∈ A | p ∈ w}, for any atom p.
We remark that, since, by Lemma 7.6, W is non-empty, A is non-empty; so this
construction is legitimate.
Lemma 7.10. Suppose c is a c-term and a = 〈w, i〉. Then c ∈ w implies
a ∈ cA. Further, if ℓ is a literal, Then a ∈ ℓA implies ℓ ∈ w.
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Proof. We consider the possible forms of c in turn.
1. c = p is an atom: By construction of A, c ∈ w if and only if p ∈ w.
2. c = p: By consistency and literal-completeness of w, c ∈ w if and only if
p 6∈ w. The result then follows by Case 1.
3. c = ∀ℓ: Suppose c ∈ w, and a′ = 〈w′, i′〉 is such that a′ ∈ ℓA. By Cases 1
and 2, ℓ ∈ w′. Pick any literal m ∈ w. By Lemma 7.7, ∃(ℓ, ℓ) ∈ Φ and
∃(m, ∀ℓ) ∈ Φ. Thus, we have the derivation
∃(m, ∀ℓ)
∀(ℓ, ∀ℓ)
(H2),
whence ∀ℓ ∈ w′, and therefore, by Lemma 7.9, w = w′. Indeed, since w is
special, the construction of A ensures that i = i′ = 0, and hence a = a′. Thus,
a′ ∈ ℓA implies a = a′, whence a ∈ cA, as required.
4. c = ∀ℓ: Suppose c ∈ w, and assume for the time being that i 6= 0. Pick any
literal m ∈ w. By Lemma 7.7, ∃(m, ∀ℓ) ∈ Φ, so that we have the derivation
∃(m, ∀ℓ)
∃(ℓ, ∀m)
(H3).
By Lemma 7.5, there exists w′ ∈W such that ℓ ∈ w′, and by construction of A
and Cases 1 and 2 above, there exists i′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that both 〈w′, i′〉 ∈ ℓA
and 〈w′,−i′〉 ∈ ℓA. Since i 6= 0 we may suppose i 6= i′, so that there exists a′ ∈ A
with a′ 6= a and a′ ∈ ℓA. Hence a ∈ cA, as required. Now assume i = 0. Then w
is special, so suppose (∀m) ∈ w, with Φ ⊢ ∃(m,m). By Lemma 7.8, m ∈ w, so
that, by Lemma 7.7, ∃(m, ∀ℓ) ∈ Φ. Again, then, by (H3) and Lemma 7.5, there
exists w′ ∈ W such that ℓ ∈ w′ and also ∀m ∈ w′. By construction of A and
Cases 1 and 2 above, there exists i′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that 〈w′, i′〉 ∈ ℓA. Since
∀m ∈ w, we have w 6= w′, and therefore a 6= a′. Hence a ∈ cA, as required.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Since we are dealing with an indirect proof relation, it
suffices to show that every H† -consistent set of formulas is true in some struc-
ture. Let Φ be H†-consistent. By Lemma 3.4, we may further assume with-
out loss of generality that Φ is complete. Certainly, Φ is ⊢H†-consistent. Let
A be constructed as described above: we show that A |= Φ. For suppose
ϕ = ∃(ℓ, c) ∈ Φ. By Lemma 7.5, there exists a = 〈w, i〉 ∈ A such that ℓ, c ∈ w.
By Lemma 7.10, a ∈ ℓA and a ∈ cA; thus, A |= ϕ. On the other hand, sup-
pose ϕ = ∀(ℓ, c) ∈ Φ. If a = 〈w, i〉 ∈ ℓA, then, by (the second statement of)
Lemma 7.10, ℓ ∈ w, whence, by the fact that w is closed, c ∈ w, whence a ∈ cA,
by Lemma 7.10; thus, A |= ϕ.
Turning now to the language H∗†, let H∗† consist of the following rules:
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1. ‘little’ rules:
∃(e, f)
∃(e, e)
(I)
∀(e, e)
(T)
∀(e, e¯)
∀(f, e¯)
(A)
∀(e, e¯)
∃(e¯, e¯)
(N);
2. generalizations of classical syllogisms:
∀(e, f) ∀(f, g)
∀(e, g)
(B)
∃(e, f) ∀(f, g)
∃(e, g)
(D);
3. the ‘Hamiltonian’ rules:
∃(ℓ, e) ∃(m, ∀ℓ)
∀(ℓ, e)
(HH1)
∃(e, ∀ℓ)
∀(ℓ, ∀ℓ)
(H2)
∃(ℓ, ∀m)
∃(m, ∀ℓ)
(H3)
∃(ℓ, ℓ)
∀(ℓ¯, ∀ℓ)
(H4).
Where rules in H∗† are obvious generalizations of counterparts in H†, we have
kept the same names. Otherwise, H∗† is simpler than H†: in particular, Rule (A)
now has only one premise, and Rules (B1) and (B2) have been subsumed under
the more general Rule (B); similarly for (D1) and (D2). The proof that H∗†
is complete for H∗† proceeds as for Theorem 7.1, the essential difference being
that various complications arising from the restricted syntax of H† disappear.
Consequently, we confine ourselves to a proof sketch.
Let Φ be a complete set of H∗†-formulas such that Φ is ⊢H∗†-consistent. We
build a structure A, and show that A |= Φ, this time writing ⊢ to mean ⊢H∗† .
The elements of A are constructed using sets of e-terms. Call a set of e-terms
S consistent if, for every e-term e, e ∈ S implies e¯ 6∈ S, and term-complete if,
for every e-term e, e 6∈ S implies e¯ ∈ S. If S is a set of e-terms, define
S∗ = {f | there exists e ∈ S such that Φ ⊢ ∀(e, f)},
and we call S closed if S = S∗. Note that the definition of S∗ for the system H∗†
is simpler than the corresponding definition for H†. For any set S of e-terms,
it is immediate from Rule (T) that S ⊆ S∗, and immediate from Rule (B) that
S∗ is closed (the analogue of Lemma 7.3). We now define W to be the set of all
closed, consistent and term-complete sets of e-terms; and we show, analogously
to Lemmas 7.5–7.7, that W is non-empty, and that, for any e-terms e and f ,
∃(e, f) ∈ Φ if and only if there exists w ∈ W such that e, f ∈ w. Further, by
(HH1) and (H4), we easily show, analogously to Lemma 7.9, that if u, v, w ∈W
with (∀ℓ) ∈ u, (∀ℓ) ∈ v and ℓ ∈ w, then u = v. Defining
A = {〈w, 0〉 | w ∈ W is special} ∪
{〈w, i〉 | w ∈ W is non-special, i ∈ {−1, 1}}
pA = {〈w, i〉 ∈ A | p ∈ w}, for any atom p,
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we show, analogously to Lemma 7.10, that, for any e-term e and any domain
element a = 〈w, i〉, a ∈ eA if and only if e ∈ w. Note that this is a stronger
statement than Lemma 7.10, and uses the fact that w is term-complete, not
just literal-complete. The remainder of the argument then proceeds as for The-
orem 7.1, but exploiting the fact that, if e is an arbitrary e-term (not just a
literal) and 〈a, i〉 ∈ eA, then e ∈ w.
We finish with a proof of the claim made, in passing, at the end of Section 2,
regarding models of sets of H∗†-formulas.
Theorem 7.11. Let Φ be a set of H∗†-formulas. If Φ has a model with three
or more elements, then it has arbitrarily large models.
Proof. Again, we may assume without loss of generality that Φ is a complete set
of formulas. If S is a set of e-terms, we use the notation S∗ in the sense of the
above sketch proof of Theorem 7.2. Suppose B |= Φ, with ω > |B| > 3. Write
B = {b1, . . . , bn}. We may assume that each bi is the unique element satisfying
some literal ℓi, since, otherwise, we can add as many duplicate copies of bi to B
as we like without affecting the truth of anyH∗†-formulas. It follows that, for all
i (1 6 i 6 n), the set of e-terms {ℓ¯1, . . . , ℓ¯i−1, ℓi, ℓ¯i+1, . . . , ℓ¯n}∗ is consistent. We
claim that {ℓ¯1, . . . , ℓ¯n}∗ is also consistent. For otherwise, it is immediate from
rule (B) that, for some j, k (1 6 j 6 k 6 n), Φ ⊢H∗† ∀(ℓ¯j , ℓk), contradicting
the assumption that bk is the unique element of B satisfying ℓk (remember that
n > 3). Now let A be the model constructed in the proof of Theorem 7.2. Since
{ℓ¯1, . . . , ℓ¯n}∗ is consistent, it has a consistent complete extension, w, so that A
contains some element a = 〈w, h〉 satisfying ℓ¯1, . . . , ℓ¯n. But, by the same token,
A also contains an element ai satisfying ℓj if and only if i = j. Thus, A has
cardinality at least n+ 1.
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